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1. Introduction 
 Although the modern cooperation between China and Africa dates back to mid-
1950s, when People’s Republic of China had just been founded, it has only received 
widespread attention since the middle of the first decade of the 21
st
 century. The event 
that marked a new stage in the relation was a successful Beijing Summit of the Forum 
on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2006, not only because it gathered top 
leaders of 48 African countries, but also because in the West it awakened an enormous 
interest in China’s African policy (Bräutigam, 2009: 1-2, 134; Shinn, 2012: 29-33, 48-
55). 
1.1. Preliminary assumptions 
 In the last few years, an accelerating Sino-African cooperation has not only re-
opened a scholarly research on the topic, but has also induced commentaries from 
policymakers, leaders, organizations and the media alike. The commentaries tried to 
assess the possible causes of China’s implication on the African continent and the 
extraction of natural resources became one of their main topics, especially in the West 
(Bräutigam, 2009: 3; Taylor, 2006). Consequently, “colonial past and neo-colonial 
present of the West” in Africa was brought into debate and China faced accusations of 
following a similar pattern of engagement with the continent (Chintu; 2013; Jiang, 2009: 
591-2; Kopiński, 2012: 4, 27; Marks, 2011; Shinn, 2012: 120-1). Moreover, the colonist 
discourse is persistent in the media, as it resurfaces with every important deal closed in 
the context of Sino-African cooperation. Thus, the Western public is frequently teased 
by both explicit and implicit accusations of “colonialism” readily reproduced by the 
newspapers, e.g. El País (Reinoso, 25 Mar 2013; 5 May 2014), The New York Times 
(French, 16 May 2014; Tatlow, 26 Mar 2013) or CNBC Africa (Naidoo, 12 Feb 2015; 
Reuters, 12 Jan 2015), or documentaries, e.g. The Chinese are coming (Barnwell, 2011). 
Without a doubt, scholars recognize such an imperialist rhetoric, as Marton and Matura 
(in Kopiński, 2012: 27) argue: 
 
There have in recent years been frequent references to the notion of a ‘new scramble for 
Africa’ in popular discourse about the continent’s present and future. Indicatively, an 
article in The Times, entitled ‘The new scramble for Africa begins’, stated that ‘Black 
gangster governments sponsored by self-interested Asian or Western powers could 
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become the central story in twenty-first century African history’, warning at the same 
time that ‘modern imperialism on the resource-rich continent will be less benign than 
old colonialism’, and that ‘great powers aren’t interested in administering wild places 
any more, still less in settling them: just raping them’ (Parris 2008). Such alarmism 
crosses the political spectrum, with an article in The Guardian in 2005 claiming that ‘a 
new “scramble for Africa” is taking place among the world’s big powers, who are 
tapping into the continent for its oil and diamonds’, adding that ‘corporations from the 
US, France, Britain and China are competing to profit from the rulers of often chaotic 
and corrupt regimes’ (Leigh and Pallister 2005). 
 
 The Western discourse appears to be infused with self-consciousness, when it 
comes to the colonial past, and with self-righteousness, when it comes to present 
relationship with the decolonized world. Whenever the Westerners attach imperialist 
motives to the Chinese, the latter neglect the accusations and simply throw them back. 
Moreover, the Chinese, as well as their African sympathizers, frequently dismiss the 
charges by stressing the win-win nature of their partnership (Marks, 2011). Chinese 
leadership would also routinely talk about “South-South solidarity”, meaning that the 
“economic cooperation” between China and Africa is a partnership between two 
developing regions of the world (in opposition to the already developed North). With its 
label of a developing country, but also its “development success”, China receives “a 
great deal of credibility as a partner with relevant recent experience” (Bräutigam, 2009: 
11; also Kopiński, 2012: 1-3). A punchy headline by CNBC Africa (Naidoo, 12 Feb 
2015), “China sees S. Africa as equal: Zuma”, illustrates the latter and indicates that the 
accusations of neo-colonialism are rather unimportant to African leaders. 
 The idea for this paper has originated in the popular discourse explained in the 
previous paragraphs, and its aim is to discuss the growing economic ties of China and 
Africa. Thus, the leading question throughout these pages will be the following: Is 
China exploiting Africa’s mining resources? The energy and minerals are indeed central 
to the cooperation between these two regions, just as central as they appear to the 
Western observers (Jiang, 2009; Taylor, 2006). However, China’s engagement with 
Africa is not limited to the mining sector, as their economic cooperation proves to be 
diverse in a number of aspects. 
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1.2. General clarifications 
 Firstly, China is frequently perceived as a centralized entity and its actions in 
Africa are believed to follow a political agenda. However, China is composed of 
different agents that oftentimes satisfy their own priorities in Africa. When it comes to 
Chinese investment, there are two kinds of companies: the state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and the private firms. The former have either a provincial or the central 
government as a majority owner, and also include projects operated by public 
institutions. The latter include collectively owned enterprises, as well as Chinese-
foreign joint ventures, or, as Chintu and Williamson (2013: 1) put it, a “full range of 
firms from large, global companies such as the privately owned telecommunications 
equipment maker Huawei […], to small, family-owned traders”. Although private 
companies are the most numerous (with estimations of proportion ranging between 55 
and 85 percent of the total), the SOEs lead the investment in terms of money value 
(Chintu, 2013; Shen, 2013: 1-8; Shinn, 2012: 129). 
Regardless of the diversity of Chinese companies in Africa, the leading motive 
for both private and government-led investments remains the “profit maximization”. 
Even if the SOEs appear to use “investment to secure access to raw materials and 
natural resources”, as some scholars point out (Shinn, 2012: 130), it can be argued that 
their motive is simply to comply with “supply and demand considerations”, rather than 
“political factors” (Chintu, 2013: 2). 
Secondly, China’s economic cooperation with Africa includes a variety of 
sectors, despite of the importance of the mining sector. There is a difference in sector 
distribution between the SOEs and private firms. The SOEs lead the investment in the 
aforementioned mining, but they are also deeply involved in the construction and 
infrastructure sector. On the other hand, the private firms have a high frequency in 
manufacturing and services, as well as in the mining sector (Shen, 2013: 7; Shinn, 2012: 
129-30).  
2. Diversity of economic cooperation 
Thus, the next section of this paper will provide a further, sector-by-sector 
insight into the topic of Sino-African trade, and Chinese investment and aid in Africa, 
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and will attempt to assess the importance of different sectors of economy vis-à-vis 
mining resources. 
2.1. Official developmental assistance 
 After the preliminary assumptions of the previous pages, the main body of this 
paper will take on the topic of economic cooperation of China and Africa. The section 
will begin with the introduction of Beijing’s foreign aid to African governments, as it is 
elemental on the matter of the cooperation, but often is just a part of China’s vast 
official financial assistance to the continent. Although it might appear to be generally 
misinterpreted in the popular discourse, in part due to its secretive nature and the 
consequent lack of official figures, “Chinese development aid is important for 
understanding Chinese foreign policy and economic statecraft” (Bräutigam, 2011: 203). 
2.1.1. Categories of official assistance 
 Traditionally the foreign aid has been dispatched by a league of Western 
countries, of which China is not a member. Their specific definition of non-private aid 
is mandated by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which at the same time 
is part of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. By their 
standards, the official development assistance (ODA) consists of grants and 
concessional loans. Moreover, apart from a low interest, the concessional loans must 
fulfill a requisite of 25-percent grant element in order to be comprised within the 
category of ODA. The bulk of official Western financial assistance to Africa falls into 
ODA category, but there are also other official flows (OOF), which may include loans 
under less favorable conditions, e.g. concessional loans with a gran element below 25 
percent, or market-rate credits, as well as transactions of commercial nature. In spite of 
this, OOF are also believed to serve developmental ends (Bräutigam, 2011). 
China’s instruments of aid which qualify as ODA by DAC standards include 
grants (mostly material goods, occasionally cash) and concessional loans, as well as 
zero-interest loans and debt relief. Ministry of Commerce (MOC) is limited to grants 
and zero-interest loans, whereas China Eximbank offers concessional loans. However, 
their importance in overall assistance is small, as portrayed by the fact that by the end of 
2005 they only amounted to 3 percent of Eximbank’s finance (Bräutigam, 2011: 203-5; 
Shinn, 2012: 148-50). 
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Nevertheless, Eximbank in its majority provides assistance that is labelled as 
OOF by DAC. Given that Eximbank, together with China Development Bank (CDB) 
and China Agricultural Development Bank, manages the totality of China’s policy 
investment, Chinese OOF necessarily constitute a lion’s share of Chinese overseas aid. 
The assistance from the policy banks takes form of export buyers’ credits, committed to 
Chinese exporters on terms nearly as favorable as concessional loans, in order to help 
their foreign sales; official loans at commercial rates, committed to African projects; 
and strategic lines of credit. The latter are packages that “combine export sellers’ credits, 
export buyers’ credits, import credits (allowing the company to finance imports of 
foreign technologies), and preferential foreign loans” and are committed to China’s 
biggest, global companies. At a glimpse these appear to be instruments of business. 
However, the Chinese might perceive natural resources as a significant source of wealth, 
hence assume that resource-backed loans at commercial rate are a fair deal for financing 
development (Bräutigam, 2009; 2011).  
2.1.2. Size of official assistance 
The estimation of value of China’s foreign aid turns to be a difficult task. 
Bräutigam (2011: 211) calculates the value of Chinese grants, zero-interest and 
concessional loans, and debt relief, i.e. Chinese ODA, in Africa to be roughly at $1.2 
billion as of 2008 – which would place it right behind DAC donors. However, given the 
fact that OOF constitute the lion’s share of China’s developmental assistance, whereas 
for the Western countries OOF are just a modest addition to the ODA, the Chinese 
developmental assistance could be of much bigger importance than initially assessed 
and amount to multiple billions of dollars (Bräutigam, 2009: 179-84). With such a 
budget Beijing is able to undertake assistance projects in various sectors. According to 
Shinn and Eisenman (2012: 150): 
 
Over the years China has provided assistance for a wide range of projects in Africa. […] 
Areas of engagement have included light industry and manufacturing, mining and 
natural resource development, transportation infrastructure, power stations, public 
buildings and stadiums, housing projects, irrigation and water supply, broadcasting 
stations, agriculture, medical teams, and specialized training in both China and Africa. 
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2.1.3. Agriculture 
 Agriculture is one of the most notable sectors in the context of China’s foreign 
aid to Africa. The first assistance project dates back to 1959 when freshly decolonized 
Guinea established official ties with China. Since then China has built more than ninety 
farms with a goal of passing them to the local farmers. Beijing has also dispatched more 
than 10,000 technical experts to Africa and set up demonstration centers, which have 
become hybrid-seed experimental farms. By 2006, Chinese agricultural projects in 
Africa amounted to about two hundred. The majority of plantations have consisted of 
rice paddies, but some projects have also generated cotton, tea, sugar, fruit, soy bean, 
fish, pig and chicken (Bräutigam, 2009: 236-41; Shinn, 2012: 151). 
 According to recent white paper on foreign aid (Xinhua, 2014), between 2010 
and 2012 China completed agricultural demonstration centers in such African countries 
as Benin, Mozambique, Sudan, Liberia and Rwanda. “The demonstration center in 
Liberia promoted hybrid rice and corn planting in areas of nearly 1,000 hectares, and 
trained over 1,000 agricultural researchers and farmers”. The center in Rwanda worked 
on the adaptability of paddy rice and fungi, and provided training to local organizations, 
including women’s associations and paddy rice growers. Moreover, China dispatched 
senior expert teams to such countries as Benin, Botswana, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, 
Mauritania, Botswana and Mali, where they assisted the local leaders in the formulation 
of agricultural laws and development plans; promoted agricultural techniques and 
technology; and helped in the application to World Health Organization (WHO) for free 
membership. Also in the same period, China has provided training to the recipients of 
its agricultural assistance, including Africa: 
 
These programs covered a wide range of sectors, including management of crop 
cultivation, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery, national policymaking on rural 
development and poverty reduction, food security, and agricultural cooperation among 
developing countries, and issues concerning the agricultural chain, such as technology 
dissemination and the processing, storage, marketing and distribution of agricultural 
products (Xinhua, 2014). 
 
 The engagement of China’s agricultural aid to Africa has gone through a 
transformation since its initial conception. It all started with large, state-owned farms, 
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but as African countries went switching the diplomatic recognition to China, Beijing has 
taken over smaller projects originally conceived by Taiwan. Furthermore, the projects 
granted to African farmers oftentimes decayed after the departure of the Chinese. An 
example of Mbarali farm in Tanzania shows that the yield could reduce to as little as 
half of initial amount. However, in mid-1980s China came back to create new and repair 
old projects. It was also the moment at which the agricultural cooperation switched 
from aid to business, as the farms were taken by Chinese state-owned companies and 
Chinese-African ventures were established. The companies were encouraged by 
“mutual benefit” slogan and a loan fund created in 1985. Also, the new profit-centered 
approach secured continuous support of the Chinese farmers. Since 2006 Beijing has 
encouraged more investment, as well as training and technology transfer (Bräutigam, 
2009: 236-52; Shinn, 2012: 151-2). 
 Africa is believed to need agricultural investment. Such is the importance of the 
sector that it became a scenario of Beijing-Taipei struggle for diplomatic recognition 
from freshly decolonized African countries. Taiwanese aid was competitive, so China 
had to outperform it (Bräutigam, 2009: 237). Moreover, agricultural cooperation is 
believed to leverage China’s utilization of African energy and minerals. Bräutigam 
(2009: 241) supports that argument with a quote from an official: 
 
Just after the [2006] summit ended, a Chinese official explained to the International 
Business Daily that China’s interest in energy and mineral projects in Africa was “likely 
to trigger some negative reactions.” China could use agricultural aid to help smooth the 
way. This could be a way to “combine ‘getting’ and ‘giving’,” he said. 
 
2.1.4. Health care 
 Beside agriculture, China’s early assistance to Africa included medical aid. 
Since 1963, when an independent Algeria established formal relations with China, until 
2009, the Ministry of Health has sent more than 20,000 medical specialists to work at 
African healthcare centers and treated up to 240 million patients. These medical teams 
conduct surgical operations and take on basic health care within standard modern 
specializations, and also put into practice the traditional Chinese medicine, as they 
conduct acupuncture therapy and herbal research. What’s more, they organize short- 
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and long-term courses for African personnel. Except for the medical teams, the Chinese 
Ministry of Health assists Africa by building hospitals, clinics and pharmaceutical 
plants, donating medicine and medical supplies, and organizing campaigns targeted at 
the infectious diseases, e.g. malaria, HIV and avian influenza (Shinn, 2012: 150-1). 
 During the Beijing Summit in 2006, the Chinese government has pledged to 
provide $38 million worth of antimalarial medicine, and to construct thirty new 
hospitals and as many antimalarial demonstration centers in (Bräutigam, 2009; Shinn, 
2012). A scholar argues that the latter represents a will of reform of the medical 
assistance to Africa. Its novelty consists of a business-oriented approach, in which, 
similarly as it did in agriculture, the aid is turning towards a “mutually beneficial 
cooperation”. That is because the demonstration centers are to be supplied by Chinese 
companies, which will receive a great deal of promotion throughout Africa (Bräutigam, 
2009: 118-9).   
 The latest instance of China’s medical assistance to Africa has taken place in the 
context of the Ebola crisis in western Africa, which started as soon as in December of 
2013. The most affected countries have been Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia. China 
began to send aid in April of 2014 and spent at least $120 million ever since. The aid 
consisted of funds, medical equipment and supplies, deployment of 1,200 medical 
workers and experts, as well as food and other goods (Xinhua, 21 Mar 2015; 26 May 
2015). The last patient in Liberia has been discharged from China’s Ebola Treatment 
Unit on the 5
th
 of March of 2015. On the 9
th
 of May the WHO declared Liberia Ebola-
free and a few days later the Chinese medical team returned to Beijing (Xinhua, 17 May 
2015). 
2.1.5. Volunteering and training 
One of the newest aid programs incorporates youth volunteering missions. It 
began in 2002 with an overseas service program launched by the Communist youth and 
a volunteer association, and in 2005 took its actual shape under the name of Chinese 
Young Volunteers Serving Africa. “At the end of 2009, China had 312 youth volunteers 
in Africa”. Their activities are diverse and since the inception have included teaching 
Chinese, sports and physical education, music, tourism skills, industrial techniques and 
cultural development; assisting in rural construction and animal husbandry, in public 
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health and medicine; upgrading information and medical technology; as well as helping 
“to develop the use of marsh gas” (Shinn, 2012: 154). 
China offers training courses and scholarships for university-degree studies. The 
training courses share the Chinese experience of urbanization, economic growth, 
poverty alleviation, and explore the fields of management, economics, agriculture, 
health, justice, education, telecommunications, security, water pollution and sewage 
treatment, etc. “By 2007, the Ministry of Commerce reported that, over the years, China 
had held 2,500 short and medium-term training courses in twenty different fields […] 
with more than 80,000 people participating”. More interestingly, during the Beijing 
Summit in 2006, China reserved half of the quota in its courses for the African 
participants. In relation to the university degrees, China’s Ministry of Education offers 
majors in agronomy, medicine, engineering, and science, but also in humanities. During 
the Beijing Summit, China pledged to double the scholarships for African students. It 
raised the quota from 2,000 to 4,000 (Bräutigam, 2009: 119-21). 
2.1.6. Infrastructure 
The bulk of China’s official economic assistance to Africa has consisted of 
infrastructure projects. According to one estimation infrastructure could amount to 70 
percent of Chinese developmental assistance to the continent (Shinn, 2012: 152). The 
estimated distribution of financing commitment confirmed between 2001 and 2007 
went as follows: The two largest areas of power and transportation received one third 
each, followed by telecommunication with a 17-percent share. Moreover, about 14 
percent of the assistance in the area was categorized as general infrastructure. At last, 
the remaining 3 percent consisted of water-supply projects. Power projects consisted 
mainly of hydropower dams, which are considered to be of great strategic importance 
for Africa’s power sector, but also included a smaller part of thermal power plants and 
energy transmission projects. Assistance in transportation consisted of rehabilitation of 
old and construction of new railways and, to a lesser extent, roads. As for 
telecommunication assistance, in majority it consisted of equipment sales between 
Chinese manufacturers and African operators. Although on a much smaller scale, the 
Chinese companies are also involved in construction and rehabilitation of 
communication backbones. However, China backed these activities with credits 
committed by two of its policy banks, Eximbank and CDB. Whereas general 
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infrastructure included multiple projects that did not fit into any specific sector, the 
water-supply projects included dams that were not related to power generation (Foster, 
2008: 16-9). 
 When it comes to China’s development assistance, the natural resources appear 
to lose priority. Nevertheless, some infrastructure projects financed by Beijing might be 
indirectly related to energy or mining. As the paper has already stated, some of the 
credits committed by China are commodity-backed. What’s more, some developmental 
projects are a part of a bigger scheme, in which the mining minerals are involved. Such 
is the case of Gabon’s Belinga Iron Ore undertaking worth $3 billion. A survey 
conducted by the World Bank (Foster, 2008: 18) portrays this case as follows: 
 
China Ex-Im Bank is also preparing to finance the 560-km Belinga-Santa Clara railway 
in Gabon, which, together with Poubara hydropower dam, and deepwater port at Santa 
Clara, is part of the already mentioned Belinga Iron Ore project. The China Ex-Im 
Bank’s loan for the project is to be repaid via sales of iron ore to China. 
 
 The gigantic development package devised in 2007 for the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC) supposed a similar case. The negotiations were held between three 
parties: Sinohydro, China Railway Engineering Corporation and the DRC. The 
infrastructure project was to be financed by two separate lines of credit of $3 billion 
each, issued by Chinese banks, and it would consist of pave roads, including an auto-
route and bridges; railway construction and rehabilitation; construction and equipping 
of health centers, hospitals, low-cost houses and two universities; rehabilitation of two 
airports; construction of two hydroelectric dams and rehabilitation of two electricity 
distribution systems. Simultaneously, a cobalt-copper mine would be developed and a 
joint venture would be established with each of the three parties receiving about one 
third of the shares. The revenues from the mine would be used to repay the former 
infrastructure, as well as the mine itself – worth another $3.2 billion. Around one third 
of the costs was to be covered by the Chinese companies, whereas the rest was to be 
covered by a credit from an undisclosed source. Eventually, however, the deal was 
modified (Bräutigam, 2011: 213-4). 
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2.2. Investment 
 As seen in the previous section, China’s official development assistance often 
serves the needs of the Chinese companies involved with Africa. Moreover, the 
investment prevails in the commodity sector, causing an impression that it is the only 
interest and recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) to the continent. 
Notwithstanding, Chinese SOEs and privately-owned firms are involved in a number of 
different sectors and this section will attempt to illustrate that. 
2.2.1. Size of Chinese investment in Africa 
 Chinese investment in Africa has been growing exponentially in the last few 
years: It increased tenfold between 2005 and 2011. Nevertheless, China’s share in the 
African investment remains arguably small. Such a claim is portrayed by the fact that 
within Africa’s inward FDI flow in 2011 China represented roughly $1.7 billion, or 
around 4 percent of the total. In addition, within Africa’s inward FDI stock by 2011 
China “reportedly” accounted for $14.7 billion, equivalent to a tiny 2.6 percent of the 
total. What’s more, Africa doesn’t seem to receive much attention from the Chinese 
investors either, as suggested by the fact that China’s investment to Africa only 
represented $1.7 billion or 2.2 percent of China’s outward FDI flow in 2011 (Chintu, 
2013; Shen, 2013: 3). 
 At the end of 2011, China’s MOC recorded 1,586 active investment projects in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, out of which 55 percent was private. However, the record of MOC 
ignores the private projects of value under $10 million, which constitute the majority of 
foreign investment projects in Africa. “Moreover, investment made by individuals is not 
subject to the certification system and therefore is not included in the database”. The 
MOC alone estimates that a number of private investment plans is actually two to three 
times bigger. A case study of six African countries contrasted the data of MOC and 
local investment-promotion agencies, and showed that the number estimated by the 
MOC was indeed accurate. According to statistics presented by the latter, Chinese FDI 
goes to forty-four Sub-Saharan countries, but the frequency of projects varies. Five 
states account for 40 percent of projects: Nigeria, South Africa, Zambia, Ethiopia and 
Ghana. Furthermore, these are followed by Tanzania, DRC, Angola, Sudan and Kenya, 
and the top ten countries together stand for two thirds of projects in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Shen, 2013).  
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Shen (2013) points that the private and state-owned firms tend to invest in 
different areas. The biggest sectors of private engagement consisted of manufacturing, 
representing 36 percent of a total number, and services, representing 22 percent. 
Interestingly, mining constituted 16 percent and ranked as the third biggest private 
sector. On the other hand, the majority of government-led projects, 35 and 25 percent of 
the projects, went to construction and mining respectively (Figure 1). There has been no 
recent Africa-wide study on sector distribution of Chinese FDI by value, but Shinn and 
Eisenman (2012: 136) are able to draw an overview of the situation: 
 
Allowing for enormous discrepancies in the cumulative total of Chinese FDI to Africa, 
a comprehensive UNCTAD study provided the most detailed information on where 
most of this investment has gone by sector. By dollar value between 1979 and 2000, 46 
percent went to manufacturing (mainly textiles, light industry, home appliances, and 
machinery), 28 percent to resource extraction, 18 percent to services (mainly 
construction), 7 percent to agriculture, and 1 percent to miscellaneous. There has been 
no subsequent Africa-wide study on the sector distribution of Chinese FDI. There are, 
however, many subsequent country investment case studies and much anecdotal 
information. By most accounts, there has been a major shift during the twenty-first 
century of Chinese FDI toward resource extraction, especially oil and minerals, 
telecommunications, and banking. 
 
2.2.2. Mining and energy 
Chinese mining companies invest in Africa’s oil, chromium, copper, bauxite, 
cobalt, iron, diamonds, coal and nickel (Shinn, 2012: 137). Although China consumes 
more than one fourth of global production of minerals, and even though Africa holds 
roughly 30 percent of global mineral reserves, Chinese FDI in African mining is small 
in comparison with other activities. This is portrayed by the fact that Chinese 
involvement in African mining sector represented only 6 percent of China’s total 
outward FDI in 2012 (Chintu, 2013). 
 Oil indeed is the sector that attracts most attention of the Western public, since 
the investment in this area amounts to multiple billions of dollars. As for China’s FDI in 
the oil sector in Africa, it is estimated that between 2001 and 2007 Chinese companies 
invested $4.8 billion in Nigeria, $2.4 billion in Angola, $5 billion in Sudan. However, 
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China was also estimated to have invested $3.1 billion in the mineral sector in South 
Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe, DRC, Nigeria and Eritrea (Shinn, 2012: 137). 
China’s three biggest investors in the oil sector are the state-owned China 
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the China National Offshore Oil Company 
(CNOOC) and China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec). By 2006, CNPC invested in 
nine different countries in Africa, whereas Sinopec invested in six and CNOOC in three 
(Shinn, 2012: 137). Chinese oil and mineral companies continue to further invest in 
Africa. The Aluminium Corporation of China (Chalco) is expected to invest about $1.3 
billion in a joint venture with British-Australian giant Rio Tinto, in order to develop a 
greenfield project in two of Guinea’s Simandou iron ore blocks. The Jinchuan Group 
acquired South Africa’s Metorex for another $1.3 billion (Chintu, 2013). In 2013 there 
have been two important acquisitions in the oil and gas sectors. The American Apache 
sold its Egyptian subsidiary to Sinopec for nearly $3 billion and the Italian Eni sold its 
Mozambican subsidiary to PetroChina for over $4 billion. Also in 2013, Ghana and 
Cote d’Ivoire began to produce oil and attracted the interest of international investors, 
including CNOOC and CNPC. However, still pending was a deal through which the 
French Total would sell its Nigerian assets to Sinopec for $2.5 billion. At last, at the end 
of 2013, Sinopec announced that it expected to invest $20 billion in Africa in the 
following five years (UNCTAD, 2014). 
2.2.3. Manufacturing 
Manufacturing doesn’t constitute as big share of Chinese FDI to Africa as it used 
to, but it still remains predominant in some countries. According to Shinn and 
Eiesenman (2012: 136-7), 90 percent of Chinese investment in Cote d’Ivoire between 
2000 and 2007 went into manufacturing; in Ethiopia it was 66 percent, in Ghana 92 
percent, in Uganda 63 percent. The same source lists Sudan’s manufacturing as a 
recipient of 50 percent of Chinese FDI, and Zambia as a recipient of 87 percent. 
However, these numbers appear questionable due to China’s heavy investment in their 
oil and copper sectors respectively. Also, China’s SEZs are “known as free trade zones, 
export processing zones, industrial zones and free ports”. Thus, their ambience is 
positive for the development of manufacturing, as represented in the Figure 2.  
Chinese SOEs, which lead China’s FDI in Africa, have explicit government 
backing and it makes it easier for these mega-companies to establish ties with local 
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governments, and consequently reduce the political risk. The SOEs can stimulate 
complementary investment, as this paper has already mentioned, both in and out of 
mining sector. The most appreciable example of the package deals is represented by 
China’s Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Africa. “These were designed and approved 
by China’s Ministry of Commerce but executed by Chinese SOEs”. There are seven 
zones: Zambia, Mauritius, Egypt, Ethiopia and Algeria have one each; and Nigeria has 
two. Related complementary activities within the zones include sectors like mineral 
processing, construction materials, logistics, solar energy and manufacture of related 
equipment. Nevertheless, the SEZs also allow to other unrelated sectors to develop: 
seafood processing, production of ceramics, textiles, medicines and furniture. Hence the 
SEZs contribute to economic development of the host country (Chintu, 2013). 
2.2.4. Agriculture 
 The overall importance of Chinese involvement in African agriculture has been 
exaggerated and China has been accused of grabbing Africa’s land for its own. In 
addition, China’s FDI into agricultural sector is oftentimes confused with China’s 
assistance program to Africa’s agriculture. The former is a rather recent development, 
whereas the latter has traditionally been in the center of China’s foreign aid and policy 
making vis-à-vis Africa. Consequently, the investment in Africa’s agriculture is a yet 
smaller portion of China’s modest agricultural cooperation with the continent. Shinn 
and Eisenman (2012: 138) offer an insight into a variety and extent of agricultural 
investment projects: 
 
In 2008, the China State Farm Agribusiness Corporation operated at least eleven 
agricultural projects on about 40,000 acres in Zambia, Mali, Guinea, Ghana, Mauritania, 
Tanzania, Togo, Gabon, and South Africa. Some of these qualified as aid projects. 
Zambia has at least twenty-three Chinese farms representing an investment of $10 
million. They all provide food for the local market. In 2007, ZTE signed an agreement 
with the DRC for a 247,000 acre palm biofuels project. In 2010, Sudan granted ZTE 
about 25,000 to cultivate wheat and maize. Ethiopia allowed China to grow sesame seed, 
a major Ethiopian export to China. 
 
 In spite of land-grab accusations, China has an undeniable interest in land. 
“China grows about 95 percent of the food it consumes and feeds 20 percent of the 
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earth’s population on only about 8 percent of the world’s arable land” (Shinn, 2012: 
138-9). Chief of China’s Eximbank commented that Africa has a plenty of unused land, 
and that was the reason why he encouraged Chinese farmers to move to the continent. 
Such statement only adds to the concern that China wants to take over African land in 
order to grow food for the Chinese market. However, this claim is dismissed by the 
Chinese. A senior official in the Ministry of Agriculture responded that similar practice 
would neither be “realistic” nor “politically acceptable”. Another official noted that 
“China will continue to meet its food shortages by importing from major agricultural 
exporters such as the United States rather than buy farmland outside China” (Shinn, 
2012: 139). 
 Indeed, agricultural investments appear attractive to Chinese businessmen. 
However the goal is not the export back to China, but rather satisfying the local market. 
The case of Ethiopia, where Chinese were allowed to grow sesame seed, may constitute 
a rare exception, given the evidence that sesame seed is Ethiopia’s major export product 
to China. Notwithstanding this exception, the Chinese tend to integrate into local 
framework to the point that there are farms in Nigeria, Kenya, Zambia, Uganda, Senegal 
and Sudan that employ equal numbers of Chinese and Africans. The number of Chinese 
farmers in these cases ranges between 400 and 2,000 (Shinn, 2012). 
2.2.5. Banking 
 With the exception of Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, which 
already in 1981 established ties with Africa through an acquisition of a controlling share 
of Equator Bank, China’s FDI in African banking is only recent. In 2007, CDB invested 
$3 billion in a 3.1 percent stake of Barclays Bank, which, interestingly, is a majority 
shareholder in South Africa’s Absa Bank. In the same year, the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) decided to purchase 20 percent of South Africa’s 
Standard Bank. The enormous investment worth $5.5 billion expanded ICBC’s 
influence over the continent, given that Standard Bank was the largest in terms of assets 
and has offices in seventeen African countries, as well as twenty-one countries outside 
of Africa. One year later, Standard Bank and ICBC announced a $1 billion fund for 
investment in mining and energy sectors within China and Africa. The China 
Construction Bank, the Bank of China and China Union Pay also are active on the 
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continent, opening branches and establishing partnerships in a variety of African 
countries: Zambia, South Africa, Mauritius, Kenya (Shinn, 2012: 140). 
 Chinese banks expand their operations as a consequence of accelerating Sino-
African cooperation. The banks advise their clients of African investment possibilities 
and expansion opportunities, but also offer a range of services: “merchant, wholesale, 
and investment banking products and services” to the local community (Shinn, 2012). 
2.3. Trade 
 Sino-African bilateral trade, similarly as China’s FDI to the continent, has 
experienced an exponential growth at the beginning of the 21
st
 century, and, with regard 
to energy and minerals, received just same amount of attention and criticism. This 
section attempts to value the commodity sector in the overall trade. 
2.3.1. Accelerated growth 
 Although China maintained political ties and official assistance with Africa 
before the initialization of the reforms in 1970s, the Sino-African trade was generally 
irrelevant. The turbulent times of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the late 
1960s constitute an exception, as Africa became to share a sizeable portion of China’s 
trade. Nevertheless, China didn’t come to play a bigger role in African trade until a 
decade ago. Sino-African trade relations were redefined: 
 
Together, China’s increasing demand for raw materials and ability to produce affordable 
consumer goods and capital equipment has become the dual catalyst for the sharp 
growth in China-Africa trade. As of 2011 multimillion-dollar trade deals between China 
and African countries are commonplace. The dollar value of China-Africa trade has 
risen twenty-fold over the last decade – from $6.3 billion in 1999 to $128.5 billion in 
2010 – when it represented about 13.5 percent of Africa’s total world trade and 4.3 
percent of China’s (Shinn, 2012: 99). 
 
 The establishment of FOCAC in 2000 supposed a new framework for bilateral 
trade. Africa has risen from constituting 1.8 percent in 1999 to more than 4.3 percent of 
China’s total trade in 2010. In the same period of time, China has risen from 2.6 percent 
to nearly 13.3 percent of Africa’s total trade. Even after the bilateral trade decreased 
between 2008 and 2009, China began raising its exports to Africa anew (Shinn, 2012). 
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2.3.2. Pattern of engagement 
 The pattern of trade followed on the framework of Sino-African partnership is 
that of China satisfying its demand for energy and minerals, and searching export 
markets for its products, as well as investment destinations. It’s a pattern that has been 
created in aftermath of Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms in the mid-1970s and has 
succeeded until now. The complementarity of the economies of China and Africa makes 
their partnership possible. The trade is generally balanced between the two regions. 
However, upon dissecting Africa into different countries important differences 
emerge. On a country-by-country basis, the balance of trade between China and 
resource-rich countries tends to disfavor the African country. Contrarily, in trade with 
non-resource-rich countries, China tends to receive the surplus. Therefore, non-
resource-rich African countries with trade deficit with China include Benin, Egypt, 
Ethiopia and Liberia. Resource exporters with trade surplus with China include Angola, 
Congo, the DRC, Libya and Gabon. Moreover, China’s exports are diversified, while 
African exports are generally formed by primary products. Since 2000, crude oil has 
made up over two thirds of African exports to China, whereas iron and platinum were 
important, too. By 2009, almost 80 percent of Chinese imports from Africa consist of 
metals and petroleum products (Shinn, 2012: 117). 
3. Conclusion 
 Sino-African cooperation proves to be a complex relationship. China interacts 
with the continent through a variety of agents. Both private and government-led 
companies invest in African projects and trade. Moreover, Beijing takes action in Africa 
through development assistance at government-to-government level. 
 The section 2.1 shows that China’s development assistance is distributed mainly 
through its three policy banks – out of which the Eximbank is the most noticeable in 
Africa. In addition, that section also showed that foreign aid falls into two categories 
according to DAC of developed countries. By their standards foreign aid, defined as 
ODA, consists of grants, concessional and zero-interest loans, and debt relief. China’s 
ODA remains modest in comparison to traditional aid donors. However, the biggest part 
of China’s development assistance to Africa is classified as OOF, which consist of 
export buyers’ credits, official loans at commercial rates and strategic lines of credit. 
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 Through the whole of development assistance, Beijing is engaged in a variety of 
sectors. Agricultural projects consist mainly of farms, demonstration centers and 
sending of expert teams. Healthcare projects consist mainly of construction of hospitals, 
healthcare centers, transfer of technology and medicines, as well as sending of medical 
missions. Volunteering projects involve a wide range of people in cultural, 
entertainment and professional activities. Teaching projects consist of short-term 
courses and university courses for the aid recipients. Finally, infrastructure development 
makes up the bulk of China’s foreign aid projects to Africa, in areas like transportation 
and power generation. 
 The latter two sections show the implication of the Chinese companies, both 
private and government-led, in Africa. Although the mining sector remains to be the 
most important in this area, the Chinese companies are also present in other sectors. In 
case of SOEs important are also construction and infrastructure sectors, whereas in case 
of private firms the manufacturing and services are also frequent. 
 In bilateral trade China-Africa cooperation follows a pattern, in which China 
import mostly mining resources, whereas Africa imports manufactured goods. Although 
there is an overall balance in trade, the relationship proves to be imbalanced on a 
country-specific basis. It is discovered that resource-rich countries tend to have an 
export surplus with China, and non-resource-rich countries tend to have a trade deficit 
with China. 
 As the trade relations and China’s FDI show, China is heavily implied in 
Africa’s resource sector. Moreover, China’s development assistance to African 
infrastructure also seems to be related to major mining projects. Nevertheless, the 
diversity of China’s approach to the continent makes it impossible to honestly judge 
China as solely interested in the exploitation of the Africa’s resources. 
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Annex 
Figure 1: Sector spread of Chinese OFDI in Africa, comparing government and 
private led projects. Source: Shen (2013: 7). 
 
 
Figure 2: Africa’s Special Economic Zones. Source: Chintu (2013). 
Name Committed Chinese SOEs Description 
Zambia-China Economic 
and Trade Cooperation 
Zone/Chambishi Multi-
facility Economic Zone 
$1.5b China Non-Ferrous 
Metal Corporation 
(CNMC) 
Mineral processing and related 
value-added industries, food 
processing, light industries, 
assembly plants, real estate 
Egypt Suez Economic and 
Trade Cooperation Zone 
$280m Tianjin Economic-
Technological 
Development Area 
(TEDA) Investment 
Holdings 
Petroleum equipment, electrical 
appliance, textile, automobile 
manufacturers, logistics 
Ethiopia Eastern Industrial 
Park 
$100m Qiyuan Group, 
Jianglian and 
Yangyang Asset 
Management 
Construction materials, steel 
products (plates and pipes), home 
appliances, garment, leather 
processing, and automobile 
assembly 
Mauritius Jinfei Economic 
and Trade Cooperation 
Zone 
$750m Shanxi province 
Tianli Group, 
Shanxi Coking Coal 
Group and Taiyuan 
Iron and Steel 
Company 
Manufacturing and services, solar 
energy, pharmaceuticals, medical 
equipment, and processing of 
seafood and steel products, as well 
as housing, hotels, and real estate 
Nigeria Lekki Free Trade 
Zone 
$370m China Civil 
Engineering 
Transportation equipment, textile 
and light industry, home appliances 
6% 
25% 
35% 
9% 
4% 
21% 
Government led 
investment projects 
Manufacturing Mining
Contracting Trade
Agriculture Other
36% 
16% 5% 
22% 
6% 
15% 
Private led 
investment projects 
Manufacturing Mining
Contracting Trade
Agriculture Other
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Construction 
Corporation 
(CCECC) 
and communication, warehousing, 
export processing, living and 
business 
Nigeria Ogun-Guangdong 
Free Trade Zone 
$500m Guangdong 
Xinguang 
International 
Group, China-
Africa Investment 
Ltd., Chinese 
CCNC Group, 
Light manufacturing, including 
construction materials and 
ceramics, ironware, furniture, wood 
processing, medicine, small home 
appliances, computer, lighting, and 
paper 
Algeria-China Jiangling 
Free Trade Zone 
$556m Jiangling 
Automobile Group, 
Zhongding 
International Group 
Automobiles and construction 
materials 
 
 
